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Abstract
Coalition logic is one of the most popular logics for multi-agent sys-
tems. While epistemic extensions of coalition logic have received much
attention, existence of their complete axiomatisations has so far been an
open problem. In this paper we settle several of those problems. We prove
completeness for epistemic coalition logic with common knowledge, with
distributed knowledge, and with both common and distributed knowledge,
respectively.
1 Introduction
Logics of coalitional ability such as Coalition Logic (CL) [11], Alternating-time
Temporal Logic (AT L) [1], and STiT logics [2], are arguably some of the most
studied logics in multi-agent systems in recent years. Many different variants
of these logics have been proposed and studied, but so far meta-logical results
have focused more on computational expressiveness and expressive power and
less on completeness, with Goranko’s and van Drimmelen’s completeness proof
forAT L [6], Pauly’s completeness proof for CL [11] and Broersen and colleagues’
completeness proofs for different variants of STiT logic [4, 3, 9] being notable
exceptions.
The main construction in coalitional ability logics is of the form [G]φ, where
G is a set of agents and φ a formula, intuitively meaning that G is effective
for φ, or that G can make φ come true no matter what the other agents do.
One of the most studied extension of basic coalitional ability logics is adding
knowledge operators of the type found in epistemic logic [5, 10]: both individ-
ual knowledge operators Ki where i is an agent, and different types of group
knowledge operators EG, CG and DG where G is a group of agents, standing for
everybody-knows, common knowledge and distributed knowledge, respectively.
Combining coalitional ability operators and epistemic operators in general and
group knowledge operators in particular lets us express many potentially inter-
esting properties of multi-agent systems, such as [12]:
• Kiφ→ [{i}]Kjφ: i can communicate her knowledge of φ to j
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• CGφ → [G]ψ: common knowledge in G of φ is sufficient for G to ensure
that ψ
• [G]ψ → DGφ: distributed knowledge in G of φ is necessary for G to ensure
that ψ
• DGφ→ [G]EGφ: G can cooperate to make distributed knowledge explicit
In this paper we study a complete axiomatisation of variants of epistemic
coalition logic (ECL), extensions of coalition logic with individual knowledge and
different combinations of common knowledge and distributed knowledge. Coali-
tion logic, the next-time fragment of AT L, is one of the most studied coalitional
ability logics, and this paper settles a key open problem: completeness of its
epistemic variants.
While epistemic coalitional ability logics have been studied to a great extent,
we are not aware of any published completeness results for such logics with all
epistemic operators. [12] gives some axioms of AT EL, AT L extended with
epistemic operators, but does not attempt to prove completeness1. Broersen
and colleagues [3, 9] prove completeness of variants of STiT logic that include
individual knowledge operators, but not group knowledge operators, and [9]
concludes that adding group operators is an important challenge.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we first
give a brief review of coalition logic, and how it is extended with epistemic
operators. We then, in each of the three following sections, consider basic
epistemic coalition logic with individual knowledge operators extended with
common knowledge, with distributed knowledge, and with both common and
distributed knowledge, respectively. For each of these cases we show a complete-
ness result. For the common knowledge case we also show a filtration result.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 Background
We define several extensions of propositional logic, and the usual derived con-
nectives, such as φ→ ψ for ¬φ ∧ ψ, will be used.
2.1 Coalition Logic
Assume a set Θ of atomic propositions, and a finite set N of agents. A coalition
is a set G ⊆ N of agents. We sometimes abuse notation and write a singleton
coalition {i} as i.
1In an abstract of a talk given at the LOFT workshop in 2004 [7], the authors propose a full
axiomatisation of AT EL with individual knowledge and common knowledge operators with
similar axioms. However, neither a completeness proof nor the result itself was published,
and a proof indeed does not exist as explained to us in personal communication (Valentin
Goranko).
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The language of coalition logic (CL) is defined by the following grammar:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | [G]φ
where p ∈ Θ and G ⊆ N .
A coalition model is a tuple
M = 〈S,E, V 〉
where
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• V is a valuation function, assigning a set V (s) ⊆ Θ to each state s ∈ S;
• E assigns a truly playable effectivity function E(s) to each state s ∈ S.
An effectivity function [11] over N and a set of states S is a function E that
maps any coalition G ⊆ N to a set of sets of states E(G) ⊆ 2S . An effectivity
function is truly playable [11, 8] iff it satisfies the following conditions:
E1 ∀s ∈ S∀G ⊆ N ∅ 6∈ E(G)(s) (Liveness)
E2 ∀s ∈ S∀G ⊆ N S ∈ E(G)(s) (Safety)
E3 ∀s ∈ S∀X ⊆ S X¯ 6∈ E(∅)(s)⇒ X ∈ E(N)(s) (N -maximality)
E4 ∀s ∈ S∀G ⊆ N∀X ⊆ Y ⊆ S X ∈ E(G)(s) ⇒ Y ∈ E(G)(s) (outcome
monotonicity)
E5 ∀s ∈ S∀G1, G2 ⊆ N∀X,Y ⊆ S X ∈ E(G1)(s) and Y ∈ E(G2)(s) ⇒
X ∩ Y ∈ E(G1 ∪G2)(s), where G1 ∩G2 = ∅ (superadditivity)
E6 Enc(∅) 6= ∅, where Enc(∅) is the non-monotonic core of the empty coalition,
namely
{X ∈ E(∅) : ¬∃Y (Y ∈ E(∅) and Y ⊂ X)}
An effectivity function that only satisfies E1-E5 is called playable. On finite
domains an effectivity function is playable iff it is truly playable [8], because on
finite domains E6 follows from E1-E5.
An CL formula is interpreted in a state in a coalition model as follows:
M, s |= p iff p ∈ V (s)
M, s |= ¬φ iff M, s 6|= φ
M, s |= (φ1 ∧ φ2) iff (M, s |= φ1 and M, s |= φ2)
M, s |= [G]φ iff φM ∈ E(s)(G)
where φM = {t ∈ S : M, t |= φ}.
Figure 1 shows an axiomatisation CL of coalition logic which is sound and
complete wrt. all coalition models [11]. The following monotonicity rule is
derivable, and will be useful later: `CL φ→ ψ ⇒`CL [G]φ→ [G]ψ.
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Prop Classical propositional logic
G1 ¬[G]⊥
G2 [G]>
G3 ¬[∅]¬φ→ [N ]φ
G4 [G](φ ∧ ψ)→ [G]ψ
G5 [G1]φ ∧ [G2]ψ → [G1 ∪G2](φ ∧ ψ), if G1 ∩G2 = ∅
MP `CL φ, φ→ ψ ⇒`CL ψ
RG `CL φ↔ ψ ⇒`CL [G]φ↔ [G]ψ
Figure 1: CL: axiomatisation of CL.
2.2 Adding Knowledge Operators
Epistemic extensions of coalition logic were first proposed in [12]2. They are
obtained by extending the language with epistemic operators, and the models
with epistemic accessibility relations.
An epistemic accessibility relation for agent i over a set of states S is a
binary relation ∼i⊆ S×S. We will assume that epistemic accessibility relations
are equivalence relations. An epistemic coalition model, henceforth often called
simply a model, is a tuple
M = 〈S,E,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V 〉
where 〈S,E, V 〉 is a coalition model and ∼i is an epistemic accessibility relation
over S for each agent i.
Epistemic operators come in two types: individual knowledge operators Ki,
where i is an agent, and group knowledge operators CG and DG where G is a
coalition for expressing common knowledge and distributed knowledge, respec-
tively. Formally, the language of CLCD (coalition logic with common and dis-
tributed knowledge), is defined by extending coalition logic with all of these
operators:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | [H]φ | Kiφ | CGφ | DGφ
where p ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , H ⊆ N and ∅ 6= G ⊆ N . When G is a coalition, we write
EGφ as a shorthand for
∧
i∈GKiφ (everyone in G knows φ).
The languages of the logics CLK, CLC and CLD are the restrictions of this
language with no CG and no DG operators, no DG operators, and no CG oper-
ators, respectively.
The interpretation of these languages in an (epistemic coalition) model M
is defined by adding the following clauses to the definition for CL:
2In that paper for AT L; CL is a fragment of AT L.
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M, s |= Kiφ iff ∀t ∈ S, (s, t) ∈∼i⇒M, t |= φ
M, s |= CGφ iff ∀t ∈ S, (s, t) ∈ (
⋃
i∈G ∼i)∗ ⇒M, t |= φ
M, s |= DGφ iff ∀t ∈ S, (s, t) ∈
⋂
i∈G ∼i⇒M, t |= φ
where R∗ denotes the transitive closure of the relation R. We use |= φ to denote
the fact that φ is valid, i.e., that M, s |= φ for all M and states s in M .
2.2.1 Some Auxiliary Definitions
The following are some auxiliary concepts that will be useful in the following.
A pseudomodel is a tuple M = (S, {∼i: i ∈ N}, {RG : ∅ 6= G ⊆ N}, E, V )
where (S, {∼i: i ∈ N}, E, V ) is a model and:
• RG ⊆ S × S is an equivalence relation for each G
• For any i ∈ N , Ri =∼i
• For any G, H, G ⊆ H implies that RH ⊆ RG
The interpretation of a CLCD formula in a state of a pseudomodel is defined as
for a model, except for the case for DG which is interpreted by the RG relation:
M, s |= DGφ iff ∀t ∈ S, (s, t) ∈ RG ⇒M, t |= φ
An epistemic model is a model without the E function, i.e., a tuple 〈S,∼1
, . . . ,∼n, V 〉. An epistemic pseudomodel is a pseudomodel without the E func-
tion, i.e., a tuple 〈S, {∼i: i ∈ N}, {RG : ∅ 6= G ⊆ N}, V 〉.
Finally, a playable (pseudo)model is a (pseudo)model where only conditions
E1-E5 on E hold.
3 Coalition Logic with Common Knowledge
In this section we consider the logic CLC, extending coalition logic with individ-
ual knowledge operators and common knowledge. We first prove a completeness
result, and then show that CLC admits filtrations.
3.1 Completeness
The axiomatisation CLC is shown in Figure 2. It extends CL with standard
axioms and rules for individual and common knowledge (see, e.g., [5]).
It is easy to show that CLC is sound wrt. all models.
Lemma 1 (Soundness) For any CLC-formula φ, `CLC φ⇒|= φ.
In the remainder of this section we show that CLC also is complete.
Theorem 1 Any CLC-consistent formula is satisfied in some model.
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Prop Classical propositional logic
G1 ¬[G]⊥
G2 [G]>
G3 ¬[∅]¬φ→ [N ]φ
G4 [G](φ ∧ ψ)→ [G]ψ
G5 [G1]φ ∧ [G2]ψ → [G1 ∪G2](φ ∧ ψ), if G1 ∩G2 = ∅
MP `CLC φ, φ→ ψ ⇒`CLC ψ
RG `CLC φ↔ ψ ⇒`CLC [G]φ↔ [G]ψ
K Ki(φ→ ψ)→ (Kiφ→ Kiψ)
T Kiφ→ φ
4 Kiφ→ KiKiφ
5 ¬Kiφ→ Ki¬Kiφ
C1 EGφ↔
∧
i∈GKiφ
C2 CGφ→ EG(φ ∧ CGφ)
RN `CLC φ⇒`CLC Kiφ
RC `CLC φ→ EG(φ ∧ ψ)⇒`CLC φ→ CGψ
Figure 2: CLC: axiomatisation of CLC.
Proof We define a canonical playable model M c = (Sc, {∼ci : i ∈ N}, Ec, V c)
as follows:
Sc is the set of all maximally CLC consistent sets of formulas
s ∼ci t iff {ψ : Kiψ ∈ s} = {ψ : Kiψ ∈ t}
X ∈ Ec(G)(s) iff
{ ∃φ{s ∈ Sc : φ ∈ s} ⊆ X : [G]φ ∈ s G 6= N
∀φ{s ∈ Sc : φ ∈ s} ⊆ Sc \X : [∅]φ 6∈ s G = N
V c: s ∈ V c(p) iff p ∈ s
The conditions on ∼ci (that it is an equivalence relation) and on Ec (that it
satisfies E1-E5) hold in M c. The proof for ∼ci is obvious and the proof for Ec
is standard. The intuition of cause is that a formula belongs to a state s in
a model iff it is true there (truth lemma). However, the canonical model is in
general not guaranteed to satisfy every consistent formula in the CLC language;
the case of CG in the truth lemma does not necessarily hold. Therefore we
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are going to transform M c by filtration into a finite model for a given CLC
consistent formula φ. Note that since φ is consistent, it will belong to at least
one s in M c.
Let cl(φ) be the set of subformulas of φ closed under single negations and
the condition that CGψ ∈ cl(φ)⇒ KiCGψ ∈ cl(φ) for all i ∈ G. We are going to
filtrate M c through cl(φ). The resulting model Mf = (Sf , {∼fi : i ∈ N}, Ef , V f )
is constructed as follows:
Sf is {[s]cl(φ) : s ∈ Sc} where [s]cl(φ) = s ∩ cl(φ). We will omit the subscript
cl(φ) in what follows for readability.
[s] ∼fi [t] iff {ψ : Kiψ ∈ [s]} = {ψ : Kiψ ∈ [t]}
V f (p) = [V c(p)]cl(φ) (where [X]cl(φ) = {[s] : s ∈ X}). Again we will omit the
subscript for readability.
X ∈ Ef (G)([s]) iff {s′ : φX ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) where φX = ∨[t]∈Xφ[t] and φ[t]
is a conjunction of all formulas in [t].
We now prove by induction on the size of θ that for every θ ∈ cl(φ), Mf , [s] |=
θ iff ψ ∈ [s].
case θ = p trivial
case booleans trivial
case θ = Kiψ assume M
f , [s] 6|= Kiψ. The latter means there is a [s′] such
that [s] ∼fi [s′] and Mf , [s′] 6|= φ. By the inductive hypothesis φ 6∈ [s′].
Since [s′] is deductively closed wrt cl(φ) and Kiψ ∈ cl(φ), also Kiψ 6∈ [s′].
[s] ∼fi [s′] means that [s] and [s′] contain the same Ki formulas from cl(φ),
hence Kiψ 6∈ [s].
Assume Mf , [s] |= Kiψ. Then for all [s′] such that [s] ∼fi [s′], Mf , [s′] |=
ψ. This means by the IH that ψ ∈ [s′] for all [s′] ∼fi [s]. Assume by
contradiction that Kiψ 6∈ [s]. Then φ[s], where φ[s] is the conjunction of
all formulas in [s], is consistent with ¬Kiψ. If we write 〈Ki〉 for the dual
of the Ki modality, this is equivalent to: φ[s] ∧ 〈Ki〉¬ψ is consistent. By
forcing choices,
φ[s] ∧ 〈Ki〉
∨
¬ψ∈[t]
φ[t]
is consistent. By the distributivity of 〈Ki〉 over ∨,∨
¬ψ∈[t]
(φ[s] ∧ 〈Ki〉φ[t])
is consistent. So for some [t] with ¬ψ ∈ [t], φ[s] ∧ 〈Ki〉φ[t] is consistent.
We claim that [s] ∼fi [t]. If this is the case, we have a contradiction, since
we assumed that ψ ∈ [s′] for all [s′] ∼fi [s].
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Proof of the claim: if φ[s] ∧ 〈Ki〉φ[t] is consistent, then [s] ∼fi [t]. Suppose
not [s] ∼fi [t], that is there is a formula χ such that Kiχ ∈ [s] and ¬Kiχ ∈
[t] or vice versa. Then we have Kiχ∧φ[s]∧〈Ki〉(¬Kiχ∧φ[t]) is consistent,
but since Ki is an S5 modality, this is impossible. Same for the case when
¬Kiχ ∈ [s] and Kiχ ∈ [t].
case θ = [G]ψ
Mf , [s] |= [G]ψ iff ψMf ∈ Ef (G)([s]) iff {s′ : (∨
[t]∈ψMf φ[t]) ∈ s′} ∈
Ec(G)(s) iff (by the IH) {s′ : (∨ψ∈[t]φ[t]) ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) iff(*) {s′ : ψ ∈
s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) iff(**) [G]ψ ∈ s iff (since [G]ψ ∈ cl(φ)) [G]ψ ∈ [s].
Proof of (*): assume Sf contains n+ k states, [t1], . . . , [tn] contain ψ and
[s1], . . . , [sk] contain ¬ψ. Clearly, φ[t1] ∨ . . . ∨ φ[tn] ∨ φ[s1] . . . ∨ φ[sk] is
provably equivalent to >. Consider ∨ψ∈[t]φ[t]. It is provably equivalent
to (ψ ∧ φ[t1]) ∨ . . . ∨ (ψ ∧ φ[tn]). Since for every [si] such that ¬ψ ∈ [si],
(ψ ∧ φ[si]) is provably equivalent to ⊥,
(ψ ∧ φ[t1]) ∨ . . . ∨ (ψ ∧ φ[tn])
is provably equivalent to
(ψ ∧ φ[t1]) ∨ . . . ∨ (ψ ∧ φ[tn]) ∨ (ψ ∧ φ[s1]) ∨ . . . ∨ (ψ ∧ φ[sk])
which in turn is provably equivalent to
ψ ∧ (φ[t1] ∨ . . . ∨ φ[sk])
which in turn is equivalent to ψ∧> hence to ψ. So inM c, {s′ : (∨ψ∈[t]φ[t]) ∈
s′} = {s′ : ψ ∈ s′}.
Proof of (**): since we defined X ∈ Ec(N)(s) to hold iff Sc\X 6∈ Ec(∅)(s),
it suffices to show the case that G 6= N . The direction to the left is
immediate: if [G]ψ ∈ s then {s′ ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) by definition.
For the other direction assume that {s′ ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s), i.e.,
there is some γ such that {s′ ∈ Sc : γ ∈ s′} ⊆ {s′ ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ s′} and
[G]γ ∈ s. It is easy to see that {s′ ∈ Sc : γ ∈ s′} ⊆ {s′ ∈ Sc : ψ ∈ s′}
implies that ` γ → ψ, and by the monotonicity rule it follows that [G]ψ ∈
s.
case θ = CGψ The proof is similar to [13]. First we show that in M
f , if
CGψ ∈ cl(φ), then CGψ ∈ [s] iff every state on every supi∈G ∼fi path
from [s] contains ψ.
Suppose CGψ ∈ [s]. The proof is by induction on the length of the path. If
the path is of 0 length, then clearly by deductive closure and by ψ ∈ cl(φ)
we have ψ ∈ [s]. We also have CGψ ∈ [s] by the assumption. IH: if
CGψ ∈ [s], then every state on every ∪i∈G ∼fi path of length n from [s]
contains ψ and CGψ. Inductive step: let us prove this for paths of length
n+1. Suppose we have a path [s] ∼fi1 [s1] . . . ∼fin [sn] ∼fin+1 [sn+1]. By the
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IH, ψ,CGψ ∈ [sn]. Since sn is deductively closed and Kin+1CGψ ∈ cl(φ),
we have Kin+1CGψ ∈ [sn]. Since [sn] ∼fin+1 [sn+1] and the definition of
∼fin+1 , CGψ ∈ [sn+1] and hence by reflexivity ψ ∈ [sn+1].
For the other direction, suppose that every state on every ∪i∈G ∼f path
from [s] contains ψ. Prove that CGψ ∈ [s]. Let SG,ψ be the set of all [t]
such that every state on every ∪i∈G ∼f path from [t] contains ψ. Note
that each [t] is/corresponds to a finite set of formulas so we can write its
conjunction φ[t]. Consider a formula
χ =
∨
[t]∈SG,ψ
φ[t]
Similarly to [13] it can be proved that `CLC φ[s] → χ, `CLC χ → ψ and
`CLC χ → EGχ. And from that follows that `CLC φ[s] → CGψ hence
CGψ ∈ [s].
Now we prove that Mf , [s] |= CGψ iff CGψ ∈ [s]. CGψ ∈ [s] iff every state
on every ∪i∈G ∼fi path from [s] contains ψ iff for every [t] reachable from
[s] by a ∪i∈G ∼fi path, Mf , [t] |= ψ iff Mf , [s] |= CGψ.
o
It is obvious that in Mf , ∼i are equivalence relations. So what remains to be
proved is that Ef satisfies E1-E6. Since Sf is finite, it suffices to show E1-E5,
which for finite sets of states entail E6.
Proposition 1 Mf satisfies E1-E5.
Proof E1 Note that φ∅ is an empty disjunction, namely ⊥.
∅ ∈ Ef (G)([s]) iff (by definition of Ef ) {s′ : ⊥ ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) iff
∅ ∈ Ec(G)(s). Since Ec satisfies E1, ∅ 6∈ Ef (G)([s]).
E2 Sf ∈ Ef (G)([s]) iff {s′ : ∨[t]∈Sf ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) iff Sc ∈ Ec(G)(s). Since
Ec satisfies E2, Sf ∈ Ef (G)([s]).
E3 Let X¯ 6∈ Ef (∅)([s]). Then {s′ : φX¯ ∈ s′} 6∈ Ec(∅)(s). Note that {s′ : φX¯ ∈
s′} is the complement of {s′ : φX ∈ s′}, since φX¯ = ¬φX . Since Ec satisfies
E3, this means that {s′ : φX ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(N)(s). Hence X ∈ Ef (N)([s]).
E4 Let X ⊆ Y ⊆ Sf and X ∈ Ef (G)([s]). Clearly `CLC φX → φY . Hence
{s′ : φX ∈ s′} ⊆ {s′ : φY ∈ s′}. Since X ∈ Ef (G)([s]), we have {s′ :
φX ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s). Since Ec satisfies E4, {s′ : φY ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G)(s) so
Y ∈ Ef (G)([s]).
E5 Let X ∈ Ef (G1)([s]) and Y ∈ Ef (G2)([s]) and G1 ∩G2 = ∅. So {s′ : φX ∈
s′} ∈ Ec(G1)(s) and {s′ : φY ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G2)(s) and since Ec satisfies E5,
{s′ : φX ∈ s′} ∩ {s′ : φY ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G2)(s). Note that
{s′ : φX ∈ s′}∩{s′ : φY ∈ s′} = {s′ : (∨[t]∈Xφ[t]) ∈ s′ and (∨[t]∈Y φ[t]) ∈ s′}
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which is in turn the same as
{s′ : (∨[t]∈X∩Y φ[t] ∈ s′}
since {s′ : (∨[t]∈X∩Y φ[t] ∈ s′} ∈ Ec(G2)(s), X ∩ Y ∈ Ef (G1)([s]).
o
Corollary 1 For any CLC-formula φ, `CLC φ iff |= φ.
4 Completeness of Coalition Logic with Distributed
Knowledge
In this section we consider the logic CLD, extending coalition logic with indi-
vidual knowledge operators and distributed knowledge.
The axiomatisation CLD is shown in Figure 3. It extends CL with standard
axioms and rules for individual and distributed knowledge (see, e.g., [5]).
As usual, soundness can easily be shown.
Lemma 2 (Soundness) For any CLD-formula φ, `CLD φ⇒|= φ.
In the remainder of this section we show that CLD also is complete.
For a set of formulae s, let Kas = {Kaφ : Kaφ ∈ s} and DGs = {DGφ :
DGφ ∈ s}.
Definition 1 (Canonical Playable Pseudomodel) The canonical playable
pseudomodel M c = (Sc, {∼ci : i ∈ N}, {RcG : ∅ 6= G ⊆ N}, EC , V c) for CLD is
defined as follows:
• Sc is the set of maximal consistent sets.
• s ∼ci t iff Kas = Kat
• sRGt iff DHs = DHt whenever H ⊆ G
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc : p ∈ s}
• X ∈ Ec(G)(s) iff
{ ∃φ{s ∈ Sc : φ ∈ s} ⊆ X : [G]φ ∈ s G 6= N
∀φ{s ∈ Sc : φ ∈ s} ⊆ Sc \X : [∅]φ 6∈ s G = N
Lemma 3 (Pseudo Truth Lemma) M c, s |= φ⇔ φ ∈ s.
Proof The proof is by induction on φ. The epistemic cases are exactly as for
standard normal modal logic. The case for coalition operators is exactly as in
[11]. o
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It is easy to check that ∼ci are equivalence relations and E1-E5 hold for Ec.
Lemma 4 (Finite Pseudomodel) Every CLD-consistent formula φ has a fi-
nite pseudomodel where E1-E6 hold.
Proof The proof is exactly as in Theorem 1, namely the construction of Mf ,
but starting with a Canonical Playable Pseudomodel rather than Canonical
Playable Model; the definition of M c contains the clause
ΓRG∆ iff ∀H ⊆ G{ψ : DHψ ∈ Γ} = {ψ : DHψ ∈ ∆}
We add the following condition to the closure: Diφ ∈ cl(φ) iff Kiψ ∈ cl(φ).
We define Mf to be a pseudomodel instead of a model, by adding the clause:
[s]RfG[s
′]iff∀H ⊆ G{ψ : DHψ ∈ [s]} = {ψ : DHψ ∈ [s′]}
We show that Mf is indeed a pseudomodel:
• Rfi =∼fi : this follows from the fact that Kiφ ∈ [s] iff Diφ ∈ [s] for any i, φ
and s, which holds because of the Kiφ→ Diφ axiom and the new closure
condition above.
• G ⊆ H ⇒ RfH ⊆ RfG: this holds by definition.
We add a case for θ = DGψ to the inductive proof. This case is proven in
exactly the same way as the θ = Kiψ case: the definitions of ∼fi and RfG are
of exactly the same form (in particular, RfG is also an S5 modality). The proof
that E1-E6 hold in the resulting pseudomodel is the same as in the proof of
Theorem 1 for Ef . o
We are now going to transform the pseudomodel into a proper model; it
is a well-known technique for dealing with distributed knowledge. In fact, we
can make direct use of a corresponding existing result for epistemic logic with
distributed knowledge, and extend it with the coalition operators/effectivity
functions. We here give the more general result for the language with also
common knowledge, which will be useful later.
Theorem 2 ([5]) If M = (S, {∼i: i ∈ N}, {RG : ∅ 6= G ⊆ N}, V ) is an
epistemic pseudomodel, then there is an epistemic model M ′ = (S′, {∼′i: i ∈
N}, V ′) and a surjective (onto) function f : S′ → S such that for every s′ ∈ S′
and formula φ ∈ ELCD, M, f(s′) |= φ iff M ′, s′ |= φ.
Proof This result is directly obtained from the completeness proof for ELCD
sketched in [5, p. 70]. For a more detailed proof (for a more general language),
see [14, Theorem 9]. o
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Theorem 3 If a formula is satisfied in a finite pseudomodel, then it is satisfied
in a model.
Proof Let M = (S, {∼i: i ∈ N}, {RG : ∅ 6= G ⊆ N}, E, V ) be a finite pseudo-
model such that M, s |= φ. Let Mp = (S, {∼i: i ∈ N}, {RG : ∅ 6= G ⊆ N}, V ) be
the epistemic pseudomodel underlying M , and let M ′p = (S
′, {∼′i: i ∈ N}, V ′)
and f : S′ → S be as in Theorem 2. Let image(X) = {s′ : f(s′) ∈ X} for any
set X ⊆ S. Finally, let M ′ = (S′, {∼′i: i ∈ N}, E′, V ′) where E′ is defined as
follows:
• For G 6= N :
Y ∈ E′(G)(u) ⇔ ∃X ⊆ S, (Y ⊇ image(X)and X ∈ E(G)(f(u)))
• for G = N :
Y ∈ E′(G)(u) ⇔ X¯ 6∈ E′(∅)(u)
Two things must be shown: that M ′ is a proper model, and that it satisfies
φ.
Since M ′p is an epistemic model, to show that M
′ is a model all that remains
to be shown is that E′ is truly playable. We now show that that follows from
true playability of E.
E1 Note that image(X) = ∅ iff X = ∅.
For G 6= N , ∅ ∈ E′(G)(u) iff (by definition of E′) ∃X ⊆ S, s ∈ S (∅ ⊇
image(X)and X ∈ E(G)(f(u))) iff ∅ ∈ E(G)(f(u))) which is impossible
since M satisfies E1. Note that in particular this proves ∅ 6∈ E′(∅)(u).
For N , ∅ ∈ E′(N)(u) iff S′ 6∈ E′(∅)(u) and we’ll see that this is impossible
below.
E2 Note that image(S) = S′.
For G 6= N , S′ ∈ E′(G)(u) iff (by definition of E′) ∃X ⊆ S, (S′ ⊇
image(X)and X ∈ E(G)(f(u))) and since S′ ⊇ image(S) and S ∈
E(G)(f(u)), S′ ∈ E′(G)(u) holds. Note that in particular this proves
S′ ∈ E′(∅)(u).
For N , S′ ∈ E′(N)(u) iff ∅ 6∈ E′(∅)(u) and this was proved above.
E3 ∀u ∈ S′∀Y ⊆ S′ Y¯ 6∈ E′(∅)(u) ⇒ Y ∈ E′(N)(u) follows immediately from
the definition for E′(N).
E4 E′ is monotonic by definition for G 6= N .
For N , assume X ⊆ Y and X ∈ E′(N)(u). Then X¯ 6∈ E′(∅)(u). Since
for ∅ we already have monotonicity and Y¯ ⊆ X¯, Y¯ 6∈ E′(∅)(u). So Y ∈
E′(N)(u).
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E5 ∀u ∈ S′∀G1, G2 ⊆ N∀X ′, Y ′ ⊆ S′ X ′ ∈ E′(G1)(u) and Y ′ ∈ E′(G2)(u)
⇒ X ′ ∩ Y ′ ∈ E′(G1 ∪G2)(u), where G1 ∩G2 = ∅
For G1, G2 6= N :
Let s = f(u), G1 ∩G2 = ∅, X ′ ∈ E′(G1)(u), Y ′ ∈ E′(G2)(u). This means
that for some X, Y , such that X ′ ⊇ X and Y ′ ⊇ Y , X ∈ E(G1)(s) and
Y ∈ E(G2)(s), so since M satisfies E5, X ∩ Y ∈ E(G1 ∪ G2)(s). Since
X ′ ⊇ X and Y ′ ⊇ Y , X ′ ∩ Y ′ ⊇ X ∩ Y , so X ′ ∩ Y ′ ∈ E′(G1 ∪G2)(u).
For G1 = N (G2 has to be ∅): X ′ ∈ E′(N)(u), Y ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u), prove
X ′ ∩ Y ′ ∈ E′(N)(u). We have X¯ ′ 6∈ E′(∅)(u), Y ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u). Assume
by contradiction X ′ ∩ Y ′ 6∈ E′(N)(u), then ¯X ′ ∩ Y ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u) which
means X¯ ′ ∪ Y¯ ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u). This together with Y ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u) and E5 for
G1, G2 = ∅ gives (X¯ ′ ∪ Y¯ ′) ∩ Y ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u), that is X¯ ′ ∈ E′(∅)(u). The
latter contradicts X¯ ′ 6∈ E′(∅)(u).
E6 Suppose X ∈ Enc(∅)(s). We claim that for every u such that s = f(u),
image(X) ∈ E′nc(∅)(u).
Assume by contradiction that there exists a Y ⊂ image(X) such that
Y ∈ E′nc(∅)(u) for some u s.t. s = f(u). By the definition of E′, this
means that there is a Z such that image(Z) ⊆ Y and Z ∈ E(∅)(s).
Since Y ⊂ image(X) and image(Z) ⊆ Y it follows that image(Z) ⊂
image(X). But it is a property of the image function that that implies
that Z ⊂ Y , and this contradicts the assumption that Z ∈ E(∅)(s) and
X ∈ Enc(∅)(s).
In order to show that M ′ satisfies φ, we show that M, f(u) |= γ iff M ′, u |= γ
for u ∈ S′ and any γ, by induction in γ. All cases except γ = [G]φ are exactly as
in the proof of Theorem 2 (see [14, Theorem 9] for a detailed inductive proof).
For the case that γ = [G]φ, the inductive hypothesis is that for all ψ with
|ψ| < |[G]φ|, and any t, v with t = f(v), M, t |= ψ iff M ′, v |= ψ. Given
that for every v there is a unique t such that t = f(v), we can state this as
{v : M ′, v |= ψ} = image(ψM ), or ψM ′ = image(ψM ).
First considerG 6= N . M, s |= [G]φ iff φM ∈ E(G)(s). Consider image(φM ).
By the inductive hypothesis, φM
′
= image(φM ). φM ∈ E(G)(s) holds iff
φM
′ ∈ E′(G)(u) iff M ′, u |= [G]φ.
M, s |= [N ]φ iff φM ∈ E(N)(s) iff (*) ¬φM 6∈ E(∅)(s) iff (as above) ¬φM ′ 6∈
E′(∅)(u) iff M ′, u |= [N ]φ.
Explanation of (*): one direction E3, the other direction E5 and E1. o
Corollary 2 For any CLD-formula φ, `CLD φ iff |= φ.
5 Completeness of Coalition Logic with both
Common and Distributed Knowledge
In this section we consider the logic CLCD, extending coalition logic with oper-
ators for individual knowledge, common knowledge and distributed knowledge.
13
The axiomatisation CLCD is shown in Figure 4. It extends CL with stan-
dard axioms and rules for individual, common and distributed knowledge.
As usual, soundness can easily be shown.
Lemma 5 (Soundness) For any CLCD-formula φ, `CLCD φ⇒|= φ.
In the remainder of this section we show that CLCD also is complete.
Theorem 4 Any CLCD-consistent formula is satisfied in a finite pseudomodel.
Proof The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 4, with the addition of the
inductive clause θ = CGψ as in the proof of Theorem 1. o
We can now use the same approach as in the case of CLD.
Theorem 5 If a CLCD formula is satisfied in a finite pseudomodel, it is satis-
fied in a model.
Proof The proof goes exactly like the proof of Theorem 3, using Theorem 2.
The definition of the model M ′ is identical to the definition in Theorem 3,
as is the proof that it is a proper model. For the last part of the proof, i.e.,
showing that M ′ satisfies φ, note that the last clause in Theorem 2 holds for
epistemic logic with both distributed and common knowledge. Thus, the proof
is completed by only adding the inductive clause for [G]φ, which is done in
exactly the same way as in Theorem 3. o
Corollary 3 For any CLCD-formula φ, `CLCD φ iff |= φ.
6 Conclusions
This papers solves several hitherto open problems, namely proving completeness
of Coalition Logic extended with group knowledge modalities. The axioms for
the epistemic modalities are the same as in the absence of the Coalition Logic
axioms, however the completeness proofs require non-trivial combinations of
techniques. The next step would be to look at complete axiomatisations of
logics resulting from imposing some conditions on the interaction of coalitional
ability and group knowledge (such as the examples in the Introduction), and
obtaining results on the complexity of satisfiability problem for CLC, CLD and
CLCD.
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Prop Classical propositional logic
G1 ¬[G]⊥
G2 [G]>
G3 ¬[∅]¬φ→ [N ]φ
G4 [G](φ ∧ ψ)→ [G]ψ
G5 [G1]φ ∧ [G2]ψ → [G1 ∪G2](φ ∧ ψ), if G1 ∩G2 = ∅
MP `CLD φ, φ→ ψ ⇒`CLD ψ
RG `CLD φ↔ ψ ⇒`CLD [G]φ↔ [G]ψ
K Ki(φ→ ψ)→ (Kiφ→ Kiψ)
T Kiφ→ φ
4 Kiφ→ KiKiφ
5 ¬Kiφ→ Ki¬Kiφ
RN `CLD φ⇒`CLD Kiφ
DK DG(φ→ ψ)→ (DGφ→ DGψ)
DT DGφ→ φ
D4 DGφ→ DGDGφ
D5 ¬DGφ→ DG¬DGφ
D1 Kiφ↔ Diφ
D2 DGφ→ DHφ, if G ⊆ H
Figure 3: CLD: axiomatisation of CLD.
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Prop Classical propositional logic
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K Ki(φ→ ψ)→ (Kiφ→ Kiψ)
T Kiφ→ φ
4 Kiφ→ KiKiφ
5 ¬Kiφ→ Ki¬Kiφ
RN `CLCD φ⇒`CLCD Kiφ
C1 EGφ↔
∧
i∈GKiφ
C2 CGφ→ EG(φ ∧ CGφ)
RN `CLCD φ⇒`CLCD Kiφ
RC `CLCD φ→ EG(φ ∧ ψ)⇒`CLCD φ→ CGψ
DK DG(φ→ ψ)→ (DGφ→ DGψ)
DT DGφ→ φ
D4 DGφ→ DGDGφ
D5 ¬DGφ→ DG¬DGφ
D1 Kiφ↔ Diφ
D2 DGφ→ DHφ, if G ⊆ H
Figure 4: CLCD: axiomatisation of CLCD.
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